Abstract: Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) as defined in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are very important for the safety of offshore oil & natural gas installations. SIS typically include the Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) that ensures that process systems return to a safe state in case of undesirable events. Partly as a consequence of the evolving "Integrated Operations" concept, a need is emerging for remote access to such systems from vendors external to the operating company. This access will pass through a number of IP-based networks used for other purposes, including the open Internet. This raises a number of security issues, ultimately threatening the safety integrity of SIS.
Introduction
The concept of Integrated Operations (IO) is emerging as the preferred way of operating offshore oil and gas production facilities. Real-time cooperation between on-and offshore staff is required in order to optimize production, and this is enabled by new technologies and new work processes.
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software and Internet connections are among the new technologies introduced, where "new" means that they have not been widely used in the context of process control before. The application area is remote operation, which enables onshore staff to log on to, and perform operations on, process control systems (PCS) and Safety and Automation Systems (SAS) offshore. This opens for a whole new set of threats related to information security that need to be considered.
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are crucial subsystems offshore. According to the IEC 61508/61611 series of standards (Functional safety of E/E/PE safetyrelated systems 1998) (Functional safety -Safety Instrumented systems for the process industry sector 2003) and the PDS method (The PDS webpage N.d.), they are of paramount importance for the safety of an offshore installation. SIS typically include the Emergency Shutdown System (ESD), which often is the ultimate guarantor for fail-safe properties at such installations.
The use of new technologies must be trusted to not have any negative impact on SIS; i.e. impact that could raise significant doubt on its claimed Safety Integrity Level (SIL) (Functional safety of E/E/PE safety-related systems 1998) . This means that the communication channels used during remote operations must be technically secure, in the sense that they cannot be tampered with, misused or in other ways used to compromise SIS. Information security is usually defined by the three terms confidentiality, integrity and availability (Information technology -Security techniques -Information security management systems -Requirements 2005) . In this paper the scope is limited to integrity concerns for SIS, which means that the objective of the "good practice for remote access" is to prevent unauthorized changes to SIS.
Industrial safety and information security issues are two related -but still rather different -fields of theory and practice (Line, Nordland, Røstad & Tøndel 2006) . In some application areas it is useful to seek to combine the two, and process control is an example of such an area. Combination will not be unproblematic, and some problems are already manifest in the mixed vocabulary that needs to be employed when we are addressing safety and security, respectively. Practitioners within both fields are concerned about this challenge. As further discussed in (Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security 2006), combining these two approaches into a coherent whole is not achieved solely through a technical report, but a modest hope is that this paper may contribute to such a development.
In this paper, a network topology for secure remote access to SIS is presented. The solution includes contractor's network, operator's office network and process control network, and security mechanisms. Also, a method is described that can be used to assess whether a given network solution for remote access to SIS is acceptable.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 refers to related work, and our research method is briefly described in section 3. The good practice network topology is presented in section 4 and section 5. The method for assessing the impact on SIL is described in section 6. We give our conclusion in section 8 and suggest further work in section 9.
Background
The background and approach for the SeSa project was documented in (Grøtan 2006) . Line et al. (Line et al. 2006 ) discuss general challenges in considering both safety and security in a given situation. Schoitsch (Schoitsch 2006) and Kosmowski et al. (Kosmowski, Sliwinski & Barnert 2006) explore relationships between traditional "security" assurance and "safety assurance" as exemplified by SIL.
The UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (formerly NISCC) has published guidelines on security of SCADA systems in general (NISCC Good Practice Guide -Process Control and SCADA Security 2005) , and on firewall deployment in such networks in particular (Byres, Karsch & Carter 2005) . The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has also released a preliminary guide to SCADA security (Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security 2006) . Naedele (Naedele 2005) presents insights on IEC standardization efforts in industrial IT security, although it does not appear that the IEC today is any closer to a finalized standard.
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) has published a set of Information Security Baseline Requirements (OLF Guideline 104: Information Security Baseline Requirements for Process Control, Safety, and Support ICT Systems 2006) which all operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf eventually will have to comply with.
The SeSa project has not significantly extended the good practices mentioned above, but ventures to combine them into a coherent whole for the specific case of secure remote access to SIS.
Method
The SeSa project studied a small number of Norwegian offshore operators and contractors, and participated in two sessions of PDS Forum in 2006 (The PDS webpage N.d.). The PDS Forum meetings have a broad participation of experts from the Norwegian process control community.
The interviews and the PDS Forum discussions contributed to the survey on how the communication networks are implemented today within the process control domain. This includes the operator's office network, the contractor's network and their solutions for remote control, the process control systems offshore, and the security mechanisms in use. Possible improvements were then identified, based on state of the art and earlier experiences, regarding structure of the network topology and security mechanisms to be added or modified. The network topology presented in this paper therefore (in similarity with many other "good practice" efforts) represents a synthesis of how it is actually implemented in the offshore industry today and the ideal solution.
Structuring the Remote Access Path
A basis for ensuring secure remote operation is that the networks that constitute the remote access path are organized in a manner that adheres to the principle of "defense in depth" a , and that suitable access control mechanisms are employed.
The "Onion Model"
Figure 1 depicts a layered access model from an operator's point of view. This model is based on two demilitarized zones (DMZ); one serving as a buffer between the operator's network and "the outside world", while the other separates the operator's administrative network (which may span several installations) from the process network (which typically is restricted to a single installation).
All contractors must be considered "external" just like the rest of the Internet, since the operator has no physical control over the contractor's networks (operators may impose contractual restrictions with respect to how and with what equipment contractors are allowed to access the operators' networks, but will have limited means of verifying these arrangements on a continuous basis). The layered model of Figure 1 can be argued on several levels. First, the separation of layers 1-3 from the surrounding is based on the requirement for SIS autonomy, as stated in (Forskrift om styring i petroleumsvirksomheten (Styringsforskriften) 2004) . Furthermore, the separation of the process network from the administrative network is as recommended in the NISCC good practice guide (NISCC Good Practice Guide -Process Control and SCADA Security 2005) . Finally, the outer DMZ protects against all external actors, with special mechanisms to allow authorized contractors to access the appropriate parts of the operator's network.
As the operator has no physical control over the contractors' networks, the latter are likely to differ from installation to installation. By contractual obligations, operators should mandate a minimum layering as illustrated in Figure 2 , where equipment used to access the operator's network is placed in a zone separated from the general office network. Note that since access in this model conceptually always originates from the contractor, there is no need from our point of view for the contractor to have a DMZ b between its office network and the internet -a single barrier (i.e. firewall) is sufficient. This is also illustrated in Figure 4 . Table 1 . The physical configuration suggestion that is described in the following sections represents a response to the identified threats and necessary countermeasures.
We have as a rule described the threats as originating from an adjoining zone, but the ultimate goal for a given attack may be to traverse all interfaces to affect the innermost zone, e.g. in order to illegitimately shut down an oil installation c . Note that no pre-compiled list of threats can ever be considered "complete" for any real networked system; the threats we have identified must be treated as a starting point that as a minimum must be compared with the network to be studied. Threats that are found to be not applicable or irrelevant must be documented as such, and a site-specific analysis must be performed to uncover additional threats.
A conservative threat analysis must adhere to Kerckhoffs' principle (Kerckhoffs 1883), and assume that an attacker has access to all pertinent information regarding a system (network topology, configuration) except passwords, encryption keys, etc.
Access Modes
If a substantial part of the need for remote access is to read status information without making any changes, it is strongly recommended to consider a technical solution that offers such "read only" access (see 5.1). A "read-only" solution will in itself be easier to verify than a "full" solution. If read-only and read-write solutions need to coexist, a "double" solution will imply that the entry to the latter solution may be even more restrictive, thus increasing the chance for success in the "1st round" in Figure 6 . Furthermore, a read-only solution may also potentially be reachable from a wider (looser) set of operational contexts on the vendor side, as indicated in Figure 3 . Hence, for a further reduction of complexity in solutions, we propose that remote access is divided into three coarse categories:
0
No access I Read-only access II Full read/write access to SIS These can be further refined as shown in Table 2 .
Access examples
The various access options described in section 4.3 can now be mapped to the layered models as illustrated by the arrows in Figure 3 , where it is assumed that 8 
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I-1
Snapshots of SIS state (via "information diode" -see section 5.1). In principle, this is the equivalent of a CCTV transmission of the terminal display.
I-2
Real time readout of SIS with possibility of specifying parameters.
II-1
Real time data transmission between installations, e.g. from a Process Station (PS) on one platform to a PS on another. This implies machine-machine communication without user intervention.
II-2
Interactive read/write access to SIS Note that prevention of access from contractor's office network cannot be done reliably by packet filtering alone. Also note that the outer DMZ will have additional access control mechanisms that are not explicitly described here.
Physical Mapping
An example of how the layered "onion" models presented above may be translated into a physical network configuration is presented in Figure 4 . Note that while the doctrine of "defense in depth" mandates that each of the firewalls A-D should be implemented as separate units, a functionally equivalent configuration using only two units with three interfaces each is possible.
We repeat that although not shown explicitly, some sort of access control mechanism is assumed to be placed in the outer DMZ (zone 6).
Barriers Between Zones
Barriers between zones 7-2 are implemented using firewalls A-E. Additionally, there is a manual "access approval" application in the inner DMZ (zone 4), where an operator can grant (or deny) access attempts originating e.g. from onshore contractors. Technically, this may be implemented as part of a terminal server application. Good practice would in this case indicate that all such accesses should be in accordance with a formal work permit.
There is no separate barrier between SAS (Safety and Automation System) and SIS; this implies that the barrier(s) is (are) represented by the command interface offered by the units that straddle the zone boundary, e.g. the ESD. To access the ESD user interface, a remote user must as a minimum authenticate to both the "access approval" application, as well as conventional authentication to log onto the Operator Station.
If the protection against i.e. PCS access to the ESD is insufficient, accessing the PCS is also critical.
Firewall E is shown as a barrier between the process network (zone 3) and SAS (zone 2); it may also serve as a barrier between different SAS segments (if appliccable).
Security Mechanisms in Individual Zones
As a rule, equipment in the inner zones exhibit "special purpose" properties to a greater extent than equipment in the outer zones. Thus, the equipment in the inner zones also generally has fewer configurable security mechanisms.
SIS (Zone 1):
• All PS units must be stripped of unnecessary functionality ("system hardening")
SAS (Zone 2):
• All PCS units must be stripped of unnecessary functionality ("system hardening")
Process network (Zone 3):
• All Operator Station (OS) units must be stripped of unnecessary functionality ("system hardening")
• Logon verified by domain controller
• Restricted traffic from this zone to zone 2 by firewall
Inner DMZ (Zone 4):
• Strong authentication
Administrative network (Zone 5):
• Domain controller for access to network resources
• General computer security measures (out of scope for this paper)
Outer DMZ (Zone 6):
• Access control on various levels;
-The general public -Guests/contractors -Own employees
OPC Communication
A common way of transferring process control information is by the use of the "OLE for Process Control" protocol. OPC was designed for communication over local area networks, which has created a demand for OPC tunnelling solutions when OPC data needs to be transferred from one process network to another. OPC tunnelling is frequently merely a bundling-unbundling operation, in which case it has no added security value as such. Specifically, there is no confidentiality or integrity protection of the tunnelled data.
Based on the dubious security property of OPC, we consider an OPC tunnel between two process networks to be an implicit interconnection of these two networks. Furthermore, it is important that the tunnel is protected against unauthorised modification or disclosure along the transmission path. This implies that the tunnel must be encrypted, and that the plaintext data must have a cryptographically strong message integrity check added before encryption.
Even though newer equipment frequently has incorporated OPC server/client functionality, a configuration that enables a PS to establish OPC communication with any PS in a different installation should be discouraged. This can be regulated using firewall E.
Since it is not known beforehand where an OPC tunnel will go, it must be assumed (as a "worst case") that it also passes through the open internet at some point between the two process networks.
Additional Mechanisms
In the previous section, recommendations for structuring the remote access path were described. In certain situations, it may be possible to further mitigate a large number of threats by architectural choices. Two such options are described below.
Read-only Status Server
It is possible to configure a read-only status server as illustrated in Figure 5 . This can e.g. be implemented by connecting a special device (which we can call "information diode") between the Safety and Automation System and a status server in the inner DMZ. The information diode can be realized by sending UDP data enhanced with extra integrity checksum, ensuring that the receiver has significantly higher bandwidth capacity than the sender, etc. Since UDP does not acknowledge each packet, it is possible to create a device that physically only can transmit information in one direction, e.g. by cutting the "receive" wire on an Unshielded The status server is here placed in the inner DMZ based on the premise that the operator will want to retain a certain control over who gets access to this information, and also takes into account that having a single centralized status server for all operations, is likely to introduce too long delays in the system. Having said this, technically there should be nothing to prevent the status server from being placed e.g. in a given installation's administrative network (i.e. on the outside of Firewall D), if this is more in line with the operator's requirements.
Ideally, the status server should receive every conceivable piece of data obtainable in the process/SAS/SIS networks. It must be determined whether this is practically possible, e.g. a new unit may be introduced that is capable of querying every valve, sensor, etc., and push this information through the diode to the status server. The bandwidth requirements must be assessed based on the size of the total data to be monitored.
d Of course, there are a few more practical problems that must be solved in an implementation of this concept -which also explains why there are commercial alternatives available.
Figure 6
The SeSa method 
Inner DMZ Proxy Functionality
In addition to providing a read-only status server, a finer granularity in access control can be achieved by not granting full "remote desktop" access to an Operator Station, but rather having a special-purpose application running in the DMZ (e.g. on the terminal server) which contains options for executing specific operations on SAS (and SIS) devices. Taken to its ultimate conclusion, this idea would imply having a large number of distinct applications to which contractors would be granted time-limited access by use of the work permit access approval regime illustrated in Figure 4 .
It would also be possible to create a single, big "granular access" application, but that would require a separate interface for configuring access rights, and such a large application would be more difficult to verify for correctness.
The SeSa Method
Use of the SeSa method on a given case is illustrated in the flow-chart of Figure  6 . In short, the method comprises the following steps:
5. If impact still cannot be ruled out, identify additional security functions within SIS, and assess through HAZOP whether this will provide sufficient protection vs the residual threat (second round). If confidence in security functions within the SIS perimeter is needed according to the previous step, assess whether the assurance level implicitly carried by the specified SIL level, is sufficient 6. If "success" is not achieved after the second round, the proposed solution should be discarded.
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Analysis) (Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) -Application guide 2001) technique is frequently used and wellestablished in industrial safety. In the SeSa method we use HAZOP to identify threats and verify whether these threats are mitigated by the proposed design of the remote access path. The SeSa use of HAZOP means that if no "problem" remains after all explicitly known possibilities have been examined exhaustively, the "conclusion" must be that the proposed solution is per definition "secure". However, there will always be a possibility that something is overlooked, or that new threats and vulnerabilities emerge or is revealed at a later time. The SeSa method cannot account for this type of (epistemic) uncertainty. Such potential "flaws" in the judgement must be handled in retrospect, when they are revealed.
It may be difficult to gauge the assurance consequences of adding a COTS component to a system that has a given SIL. Kosmowski et al. (Kosmowski, Sliwinski & Barnert 2006) argue for a mapping between SIL and Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) (Information technology -Security techniques -Evaluation criteria for IT security 2005). However, it should be noted that a given EAL only says something about our assurance that the mechanisms defined in the appropriate Protection Profile have been properly implemented; if these are insufficient to guarantee our desired SIL, a mapping between EAL and SIL is meaningless. On the other hand, if the mechanisms we rely on to provide our given SIL is included in the component's Protection Profile, we believe that the mapping proposed in (Kosmowski, Sliwinski & Barnert 2006) may be appliccable.
New challenges
The SeSa approach covers an important, but however limited part of the implications of Integrated Operations (IO) in relation to SIS. From being primarily focussed on technology development and application, the development of IO now takes new directions (Tor Olav Grøtan and Eirik Albrechtsen and Rolf Rosness and Eirik Bjerkebaek 2008):
• increased focus on challenges related to new work processes, integration of information throughout whole value chains, and ICT vulnerability
• wide recognition of the prime significance of human and organisational factors for the success of IO
• development of virtual plants comprised by onshore and offshore elements that are transformed into a fully integrated functional community This signifies the possibility of a number of fundamental changes in the operation of the oil and gas fields, that may eventually have impact on the operation of SIS which reach way beyond what can be depicted as a mere channel for remote access. To investigate these possible impacts, it will be necessary to employ a method that can capture a holistic picture of IO-related change encompassing a full MTO e -perspective, and transform these changes into new requirements to SIS, and (theoretically) by implication, to the PDS method. Figure 7 indicates such an extended scope, of which SeSa will be an integral, but limited part.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented good practice for secure remote access to Safety Instrumented Systems in an offshore process control system. Furthermore, we have introduced the SeSa method for assessing whether a given network solution is acceptable when it comes to ensuring the integrity of SIS.
The network solution presented complies with advice and guidance given by several actors in the industry. This fact contributes to assurance that the solution is acceptable and ensures an appropriate level of security for SIS.
The paper has also indicated a possible extension of scope for working with the security, as well as the safety of SIS as an autonomous system.
Further Work
Further work needs to be done along the following lines: a) Further trial of the method on "real" cases b) Extending the scope to broader "SAS" contexts c) Development of schemes to update "approved" solutions in light of new knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities e Man-Technology-Organization d) Operation and implementation of the "value-chain" that is the result of a successful use of the SeSa method.
The latter is considered the most urgent. First, because of the limited scope of the SeSa method presented herein (providing a functional requirement specification), of which implementation and management across organisational borders is not included. Second, because a dynamic environment, both technically and organisationally, is expected to be a central characteristic of the Brave New World of Integrated Operations. The "value-chain" has to be re-constructed and updated rather frequently. Figure 8 indicates how the characteristics of this "value-chain" may anticipated, as well as its consequences in relation to SIS. The IO change space can be based on (Tor Olav Grøtan and Eirik Albrechtsen and Rolf Rosness and Eirik Bjerkebaek 2008) and (Tor Olav Grøtan and Eirik Albrechtsen 2008) . From these, which are directed at a more general major accident scenario, specific SIS scenarios can be derived. • who/what may fail?
• what may go wrong despite the absence of failure?
• what may go right while encountering surprise and disturbance?
From a security perspective, a similar interpretation may be based on viewing SIS, as well as the information systems employed by different actors engaged in operating/using SIS, as a distributed information system. IO change space
